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Overview 	  
Over the past 30 years, the Paris Ile-de-France Region has experienced massive and profound 
changes in transportation. Myriad policy initiatives and programs introduced across levels of 
government have promoted strong alternatives to private vehicle use while improving 
accessibility to major economic and financial centers. These include enhancing public 
transport services and infrastructure, actively promoting non-motorized transportation (e.g., 
cycling, walking), and reducing car use through street layout and urban design. Beyond the 
City of Paris, such changes were also initiated from the periphery and have spread throughout 
the wider region. They combine major flagship initiatives such as the urban tramway 
renaissance and Velib’ bike sharing system1 with salient political discourses—for instance, 
about air pollution, noise, and “giving the city back to its inhabitants”—and long-term, less 
visible, incremental changes on existing networks and systems (i.e. maintenance, new 
technologies, optimization measures). Concomittantly in Paris, car traffic stabilized from the 
early 2000s, as daily car use steadily declined both in the center city and inner suburbs. 
Meanwhile, the use of public transport sharply increased across the region, and the average 
number of daily bicycle trips doubled between 2001 and 2010.2 Such transformations are 
noteworthy in light of wide perceptions of the urban regional transport system in Paris as a 
case of quasi-governance failure with high levels of road congestion and ageing transport 
services (RER).3  
 
 
Figure  1.  The  evolution  of  transport  in  Paris  and  the  Ile-­‐de-­‐France  Region:  “Peak  car”?  
 
Source: STIF & IAURIF 2011 
 
 
                                                
1 The Grand Paris Express project will only be covered in this chapter to the extent that it accelerated 
improvements and changes in transport that have already taken place. This major capital investment, which is 
currently being planned in Paris and the inner suburbs area, relies upon extensive resources, and financing 
mechanisms (some € 25 billion Euros until 2030, more likely to be 35). 
2 Across the OECD, declining car use is attributed to a complex combination of macro-economic, social and 
cultural trends observable throughout industrialized societies (Kaufmann et al., 2004; Goodwin, 2012, 29). 
However, in Paris, such modal shifts are also concomitant with transport innovations and changes.  
3 Moreover, the Paris and Ile-de-France region are frequently depicted as an extreme case of fragmentation, 
complexity and interdependence between levels of governance (Larroque et al., 2004; Orfeuil and Wiel, 2012; 
Lefèvre et al., 2014). 
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 City of Paris Métropole du 
Grand Paris 
(since January 
2016) 
Ile-de-france Region 
(since 1982) 
French State 
Population  2.265.866 
 
7.000.000 11.800.000  
Area 105 km2 762 km2 12000 km2  
Density  23685/km2 10334 /km2 996 /km2  
Democratically 
elected political 
leadership 
Mayor of 
Paris (since 
1977) 
None  President of Regional 
Council (since 1886) 
 
Number of  20 Boroughs  1291 municipalities, 8 
Départements.  
 
Budget and 
investment 
capacity 
€ 9 
billion/year 
€ 65 million/year € 5 billion/year  
Competence over 
transport 
Municipal 
roads, bus, 
cycling 
None  Regional railways 
(Metro, RER and 
Transilien), rapid bus 
transit 
Highways and railways 
Reponsibility of 
transport networks 
Vélib’, 
Autolib’  
None  Regional public 
transport authority 
(STIF) 
Public-owned transport 
companies: RATP, 
SNCF;  
Société du Grand Paris as 
the project owner and 
contracting authority of 
the Grand Paris Express 
project 	  
This case argues that the transformation of urban transport in Paris and the Ile-de-France 
Region is inextricably linked to evolving relationships between three levels of government—
the City of Paris, the Ile-de-France Region and the French State—entailing as much 
competition and conflict as negotiation and cooperation. Where transport planning and 
implementation was mainly organized at the national level prior to the 1990s, it became 
increasingly territorialized at both the regional and the urban level as local and regional 
authorities struggled against the State, its agencies, and state-owned companies in assertion 
of their political autonomy amidst long-term decentralization, metropolisation, and urban 
competition. Beyond its substantive importance, transport provided a critical issue and 
instrumental mechanism for asserting political and institutional leadership, developing new 
alliances, and gaining visibility at various levels and scales. As key individuals and collective 
actors—including mayors, their deputies, state elites, political parties, public-private 
partnerships, and municipal collaborations—initiated myriad policy actions, some were 
radical and others incremental, resulting from negotiation as well as reaction. This mix of 
experiments and leadership competition not only combined to vastly transform the urban 
transport system in the city and region, but the emerging mode of governance further 
transformed the way through which transport is planned and implemented in terms of scale, 
modes, and collective action/networks of actors in the capital-city region.  
 
The important role of transport experts, private firms, social movements, and political 
leadership notwithstanding, understanding and accounting for policy innovation and change 
in transport requires attention to evolving forms of institutional capacity building in the 
capital-city region. Hence the case study research systematically analyzed the long-term 
accumulation and mobilization of policy resources—including knowledge and expertise, 
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policy instruments, political legitimacy, and financial resources—together with major 
political conflicts between three levels of government over a 40-year period from 1975 
onwards.4 As it turns out, policy failures and political conflicts were no less important than 
immediate successes and gains in cumulating policy resources, repertoires, and impacts in 
urban transport. As we shall see shortly, the introduction of long-term spatial development 
policy goals for the capital-city region through the 1965 Strategic Document for Urban and 
Spatial Planning, limited efforts by the conservative mayoral administrations of Jacques 
Chirac and Jean Tiberi to initiate transport policies in Paris, and regional governance failures 
revealed by the 1994 State-Region Contracts and Regional Strategic Development Plan set 
the foundations for the left coalition’s advancement of a Parisian approach to sustainable 
urban transport under Mayor Bertrand Delanoé and its diffusion at the regional level as 
elaborated in the 2007 Regional Spatial Planning Document and 2008 Regional Mobility 
Plan. 
 
The following account begins with a brief historical overview of transportation planning in 
Paris and the Ile-de-France Region under state leadership, precisely because the shifting 
mode of urban mode of urban regional governance that ushered in major transportation 
changes came in response to tensions and contradictions arising from this previous transport 
governance regime. The bulk of the case then focuses on the “why’s” and “how’s” of 
transport innovations and changes with respect to both the rapid advances in Paris and the 
slower transformations in the region. It traces the ways in municipal and regional authorities 
increasingly framed transport issues and challenged the leadership of state policies and 
agencies amidst processes of decentralization, metropolitanism, and urban competition. We 
further examine how incremental system changes and institutional capacity building, 
ambitious transport policies and projects, and political competition combined to deliver 
impressive outcomes in the urban regional transport system. 
 
 	  
The Reign of State Bureaucrats: Transportation 
Planning in Paris and the Ile-de-France Region 
until 1975 	  
France has a long history of state development, strong territorialisation of political life, and 
robust public policies. When the Third Republic (1870-1940) granted political autonomy to 
36,000 communes, it excluded Paris, which would remain directly governed by state 
representatives with a weak advisory council until the mid 1970s. The capital-city’s transport 
system was integral to the making of the French State, which was centralized around a single 
financial, political and administrative center. The development of the national road and the 
railway network followed a star-shaped system with Paris at its center. At the regional level, 
the rapid growth of Paris as a metropolis prompted development of an urban tramway 
network and suburban rail-based system in the 19th century and the Paris metro system from 
                                                
4 The authors examined archives, law and reports about transport and mobility as well as conducted a systematic 
press review. We completed this analysis by conducting two series of semi-structured interviews beteen July 
2014 and June 2015 with key experts and decision-makers participating in decision-making about transport and 
spatial planning. 
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the beginning of the 20th century. Following, growing car use led to dismantlement of the 
urban tramway network in the 1930s and its replacement by buses.   
 
The context of postwar reconstruction affirmed and extended the leading role of the State. 
Rapid population and economic growth, particularly in the inner suburbs, increased demands 
for transportation, housing, and urban services. The governance of the capital region, 
including the City of Paris, was organized according to the logic of “divide and rule,” 
whereby myriads of local autonomous municipalities lacked expertise, money, and resources 
in contrast to a powerful deconcentrated state administration (Prat 2012). In transport, pre-
existing public and private urban transport operators were merged into a single, state-owned 
company—RATP (Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens)—that was responsible for 
public transport in Paris and for some segments of the suburban railway network. Similarly, 
the newly created state-owned railway company—SNCF (Société Nationale des Chemins de 
Fer)—assumed responsibility over regional railways. While the historic center relied on a 
dense public transport network, the inner suburbs (petite couronne) and emerging outer 
suburbs (grande couronne) were notoriously under-equipped.  
 
In 1965, the conservative Gaullist government (1959-1969) reached a historic political 
agreement with the Communist Party, partly resulting in the introduction of long-term spatial 
development policy goals for the capital-city region through the Strategic Document for 
Urban and Spatial Planning (SDAU), formulated under the leadership of Paul Delouvrier, 
State Commissioner of the Ile-de-France region. Following, La Défense developed as a new 
business district on the western outskirts of Paris, and various suburban new towns (e.g. Saint 
Quentin, Marne La Vallée, Cergy Pontoise, Evry) arose some 30 kilometers away from the 
City of Paris, following the British experience. With transport highlighted as a major policy 
priority alongside housing and economic development, the SDAU included an ambitious road 
and railway infrastructure program to enhance regional access to the Paris transport system. It 
further reorganized the administrative system—the Département de la Seine was abolished 
and divided into four départments,5 which, together with 4 other départements in the outer 
suburbs of Paris, were included in a new administrative region (see map below). 
 
During this period of “strong leadership”—from the State and in particular the De Gaulle-
Delouvrier tandem—transport in the capital region was dominated by engineers, planners, 
state agencies, civil servants in competition with each other, and, at the margin, some 
influential mayors and ministers.6 Despite the appearance of coherence, the system was 
overruled by political competition between the conservative Gaullist regime and the 
Communist Party, which ruled over most municipalities in the inner suburbs of Paris (i.e., the 
“red belt”).  Within the state apparatus itself, several powerful administrations7 and elite 
groups competed for leadership over the governing of regional affairs (Estèbe and Le Galès, 
2003). SNCF and RATP were run by state elites belonging to what is commonly known as 
                                                
5 The département is an administrative division of government below the regional level and arrondissements, 
which further divide into cantons and communes. 
6 For some, this period is considered a “golden age” in transport planning which was irremediably lost after 
decentralization reforms but nonetheless still justifies state interventionism; by contrast, others consider it as 
technocratic, contrary to the functioning of any democratic regime, and strongly oppose attempts at reviving 
state interventionism. 
7 This was particularly the case for the Ministry of Infrastructures (Ministère des Ponts et Chaussée, then 
Ministère de l’Equipement) and the equivalent of the Home Office (Ministère de l’Intérieur). Specialized state 
agencies were created at the regional level in order to run strategic services (e.g. water, health, housing etc.). 
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Grands Corps (the most prestigious status groups within the civil service), in cooperation and 
conflict with the then powerful Communist trade union8. Such level of political and 
organizational competition prevented any major developments in transport until the mid 
1960s.9  	  
Figure 2. Map of rapid urban growth in the Ile-de-France Region between 1982 and 
2008 (already urbanized areas in 1982 featured in pink) 
 
(Source: IAU 2013) 
 
Figure 3. Map of administrative organization before and after the 1967 
administrative reform 
 
Source: IAURIF 	  
                                                
8 Future elites—generalists and specialists, such as transport engineers—are trained in prestigious grandes 
écoles, as an alternative to universities. Most state elite bureaucrats—across state departments, public 
enterprises (RATP, SNCF) and in the private sector—were trained at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, 
established in 1747 to train competent officers for bridges and roads. Other specialized schools include those 
offering practical training for Mines; Bridges and Roads; Civil Aviation and Statisticians (Bilan, Gally 2016 
forthcoming).  
9 While the Paris metro only served the City of Paris and operated with pre-war rolling stock, only 3 km of 
additional metro lines were built. Several road projects were postponed. Suburban railway services remained 
limited, and the lack of connection between public transport networks made transfers extremely complicated.  
Administrative organization before and after 1964 
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To promote accessibility to the New Towns, the SDAU included some 900 km of regional 
highways to be constructed under the direct supervision of state representatives at the level of 
the département.10,11 In Paris, development of the Paris ring road (1953-1973) and highway 
alongside the right bank of the Seine River (1966) enabled speed in the historic city center.12 
The first development phase (1969-1977) of the Regional Express Rail network (RER) 
connected the center of Paris with the new financial District of La Défense, as well as with 
historic suburbs (e.g. St Germain en Laye, Nanterre, Aubervilliers) and new towns (Cergy, 
Marne-La-Vallée, etc.). 13  Considered the flagship modern public transport, it soon 
transported millions of daily commuters within the Paris region (Larroque et al., 2014). 
However, divided leadership and chaotic decision-making owing to politically-charged 
discussions between local mayors and state authorities, along with continued conflicts 
between SNCF and RATP, stymied continued progress (Sfez 1981).14  
  
In effect, the SDAU failed to reduce inequalities within the region and created new ones. In a 
political system largely dominated by rural interests, urban mayors, and Paris City Council, 
the inner and outer suburbs of Paris, including many working class and ethnically diverse 
areas, failed to gain priority. While Paris faced growing levels of road congestion, it had a 
functional public transport system. Contrastingly, the Ile-de-france region lacked such levels 
of public intervention, and the rapid low-density urbanization outside the New Towns fueled 
increasing car use (Orfeuil and Weil, 2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The Coming Age of Decentralization (1975-1997): 
Institutional Rescaling and Small-Scale Innovation 	  
                                                
10 Examples include the Western Highway towards Mantes (1963), the A1 (1968), and later on the A15, which 
serves the new town of Cergy-Pontoise, located toward the west of Paris. 
11 The introduction of motorway concessions—funding mechanisms targeting network users as opposed to 
taxpayers through toll fees—contributed to this new momentum and ensured sufficient funding for future 
developments and maintenance. 
12 Further attempts to develop urban motorways in Paris were met with strong mobilizations from residents and 
environmentalists in the name of heritage protection. Most projects were temporarily abandoned following the 
1974 presidential election, which put an end to the Gaullist regime, and in the context of the economic crisis, but 
were carried out later on as part of future investments programs from the State.  
13 To reduce investment costs, existing railways were reopened when possible. A total investment of €1.37 
billion was covered by revenues from taxes on local businesses that is, the versement transport. This tax was 
introduced in 1973 in order to finance major public transport infrastructure projects in large French cities. It is 
levied on all companies, both private and public, with more than 9 employees. 
14 In the end, SNCF and RATP shared ownership and the daily operation of the network.  
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Decentralization reforms beginning in the 1970s—the election of the mayor of Paris from 
1977, the 1982 Decentralization Laws, which progressively devolved considerable powers to 
subnational levels of government across policy domains,15 and creation of the Ile-de-france 
Regional Council in 1986—did not necessarily expand municipal autonomy in urban 
transport. A telltale sign of the State’s reluctance to devolve authority to the capital-city 
region was when the 1982 Domestic Transport Act equipped elected mayors with new 
resources to develop strong public transport alternatives at the metropolitan level with the 
exception of the entire Ile-de-France Region (Vincent et al., 2014; Hall 2015).  
 
TRANSPORT GAINS LOW POLITICAL PRIORITY IN THE CITY OF 
PARIS  
 
The election of Jacques Chirac, former Prime Minister and leading figure of the Conservative 
Party16, as the first mayor of Paris, potentially enhanced the city’s capacity to extract 
resources from the central government. Moreover, the Paris City Council gained access to 
increased policy resources, including a large autonomous administration and budget. Yet his 
administration appeared more concerned with cultural flagship projects that rivaled those of 
President Mitterand (Urfalino 1994). In this context, transport was not considered “urban,” 
that is, an area in which urban authorities developed their own thinking; nor did it emerge as 
a policy priority on the local political agenda—being considered “low” politics and mostly 
restricted to traffic planning. Further, transport initiatives required the mayor to negotiate 
with state elites in the regional administrations who oversaw traffic congestion and the 
expansion of road capacity, as well as with RATP, which took over the organization of public 
transport services (metro and bus networks)—a daunting task. 
 
While Chirac’s transport policy primarily combined parking management and planning tools 
as a way to increase roadspace for car traffic,17 popular mobilizations against the negative 
externalities of car traffic prompted his administration to introduce alternative measures. In 
1982, following the accident of the cycling advocate Jacques Essel, Chirac introduced a plan 
of some 80 km of “courtesy corridors” for cyclists. Yet this project faced strong resistance 
from members of the city administration as well as state representatives, who opposed taking 
away road space from car traffic. In addition, RATP bus drivers strongly opposed the idea of 
opening bus lanes, which they had fought hard for and obtained in 1975, to cyclists, 
considered a hindrance to bus operations. In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting goals 
and interests, the City of Paris decided to locate “courtesy corridors” between bus and car 
traffic lanes. Soon renamed “corridors of death,” these initiatives were not only brought to an 
end, but cycling became a political taboo for almost 20 years. In 1999, Mayor Chirac’s 
successor, Jean Tiberi, finally succeeded at implementing a cycle plan (introduced January 
1996), developing two major cycling axes in the city and assigning cyclists the right to use 
enlarged bus lanes that were also physically separated from car traffic—no doubt a lesson 
gleaned from the previous administration’s failed efforts.  
 
                                                
15 These were matched with decentralization of funding or matching financial mechanisms, such as the State-
Region Contract Plans. 
16 He later served two terms as President of the Republic (1995-2007). 
17 In addition to building permits, this was also achieved through concession agreements with private firms. 
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As popular mobilizations had compelled the Chirac administration to explore alternatives to 
private motorized transport, Mayor Jean Tiberi faced increasing public concerns about noise 
and air pollution, which required policy response. As part of the national debate about the 
1996 Law on Air Quality, the city administration overseeing quality of life issues developed 
new tools linking traffic congestion to levels of noise (Zittoun 2007), although the mayor 
neglected to provide the political support needed to develop it into a comprehensive policy 
tool. Moreover, lacking transport connectivity to large-scale housing development and urban 
renewal programs alongside the Boulevard Périphérique in the south of Paris prompted the 
Tiberi administration to consider urban tramway proposals, traditionally under the 
jurisdiction of state authorities. The first proposal, developed by the centralized transport 
sector (SNCF, RATP and Transport Ministry), sought to transform an existing railway line 
into an urban tramway line alongside the Boulevard Périphérique18. The city administration 
developed a second proposal—the “Boulevard des Maréchaux alternative”—advocating the 
construction of an ex-nihilo urban tramway network alongside this circular inner-ring road. 
Urban planners argued that the main rationale of transport networks and systems was not 
mass transportation at highest possible speed, but rather to contribute to developing high 
quality urban public space and mobility at the neighborhood level. While the city’s proposal 
entailed higher infrastructure and operating costs,19 the strategic location of the urban 
tramway project also promoted access by a greater number of residents and daily commuters. 
In addition to attracting widespread interest as a major opportunity for public investment, the 
city’s proposal even gained support from the Socialist-Green opposition due to its expected 
reduction of car traffic, noise and air pollution. In the absence of sufficient policy resources, 
Mayor Tiberi was unable to overcome competition between the two proposals, resulting in 
policy impasse (Zittoun 2008). However, what became known as the “tramway controversy” 
highlighted the importance of developing local knowledge, expertise, policy capacity, and 
broad-based support in the area of transport.20 
 
IN THE SHADOWS OF PARIS: FAILED LEADERSHIP AT THE 
REGIONAL LEVEL  
 
As with the direct mayoral elections in Paris, the creation of a new, democratically elected 
level of government the regional level—the Ile-de-france Regional Council—far from 
guaranteeed regional autonomy in transport planning and implementation. With 
decentralization, State-Region Contracts (Contrat de Plan Etat Region) required joint 
decisions by the central government and regional council on transport investments and policy 
priorities. 21  In reality, state bureaucrats retained the upper hand and stymied 
institutionalization of policy proposals and plans, as in the cases of the 1994-2000 State-
Region Contract and the 1994 Regional Strategic development plan (SDRIF). Both 
documents largely reaffirmed the 1965 Strategic Document for Urban and Spatial Planning 
(SDAU) in terms of continuing a polycentric model of regional spatial development and 
                                                
18 In addition to land availability, this option offered a higher distance-speed ratio—28 km/hour—and a capacity 
of 17.000 passengers per hour. Its estimated costs amounted to € 270 million. 
19 Respectively €320 million due to land acquisitions, additional stops and the transformation of existing road 
network and regarding operating costs, they were also estimated higher due to lower distance-speed ratio (15 to 
20 km / hour) and capacity of some 10,500/12,500 passengers per hour.  
20 The Paris tramway controversy is developed into more details in Section 5.  
21 In principle, the State favored a more hands-off approach in the capital region and transferred most of its 
competencies and policy resources to subnational levels of government. 
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maintaining the capital region’s centrality as a national and major European hub. The 
powerful National Road Directorate secured €1.5 billion as part of the State-Region Contract 
to develop several ring roads in parallel to the Boulevard Périphérique and accommodate the 
rapid development of car use in the wider region, with the support of private developers and 
the influential building industry.22 It further identified a series of secondary regional hubs, 
including new towns and the airports, and expressed a clear preference for highways at the 
expense of the secondary road network.23 In the absence of regional coordination capacity 
around spatial planning, competition between municipalities accelerated low-density 
urbanization and urban sprawl. The growing mismatch between a centralized and insufficient 
public transport system on the one hand, and the redistribution of urban functions, residences, 
jobs and services on the other hand directly contributed to increased dependence on the 
automobile and congestion (Desjardins and Drevelle 2014). 
 
 
Figure 4. Map of Ile-de-france road system (as of 2014) 
 
 
 
(Source: DiRIEF) 
 	  
Though the State now only financed a third of capital investments in transport, state 
administrative elites, affiliated with RATP and SNCF as well as successive Prime Ministers’ 
cabinets, continued to dominate transport planning and implementation. RATP and SNCF, 
jockeying to gain the lead over regional public transport provision, aggressively competed for 
                                                
22 Several firms, such as Vinci Autouroute (ASF network), Abertis (Sanef network) and Eiffage-Macquarie 
group (APPR/AREA network), now operate the network through motorway concessions. Over time, increased 
coordination was needed to reduce traffic congestion throughout the region. The SYTADIN system was 
introduced in order to measure traffic and produce real-time information. Today, the Ile-de-France motorway 
network accommodates 4 million users daily and is placed under the supervision of a single state administrative 
division at regional level, the Direction des Routes de la Région Ile-de-France (DiRIF). 
23 This remains underdeveloped to date. 
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new infrastructure development.24 Eventually receiving an equal division of resources, they 
appropriated resources that would have otherwise helped maintain the existing network and 
support an integrated approach to transport planning in the wider region. In the city of Paris, 
RATP and SNCF prevailed in constructing a large tunnel, which concentrated traffic around 
the Châtelet-Les Halles Station, in place of an orbital ring road around Paris that would have 
relieved traffic on radial routes, thus exacerbating congestion and delays. Additionally, each 
organization developed its own flagship project—a new metro line in Paris (Meteor) for 
RATP, alongside the existing RER A line, and a new RER line (Eole) for SNCF—which not 
only furthered centralization of the network but also diverted funding from maintenance, 
renovation, and extension on existing RER and Metro lines.25 Moreover, SNCF revised its 
funding priorities to favor the development of high-speed to the detriment of the suburban 
train network despite increasing ridership. The result was chronic underinvestment in public 
transport, sluggish development and lacking reliability of the RER (Goldberg 2012), and an 
ageing suburban train system. For many observers within and outside the state 
administration, the RATP-SNCF conflicts, particularly the Eole-Meteor, signaled weakening 
political leadership and institutional trauma.  
 
Lacking capacity to pose and develop an alternative to state interventionism, regional 
municipalities tended to react against existing political debates and policies. In implementing 
the 1994-2000 State-Region Contract, the State failed to provide adequate funding and other 
promised goods, resulting in delayed investments, as is often the case with contracts between 
local authorities and the French government. However, other metropolitan areas did not face 
the level of institutional and organizational fragmentation—for instance, involving RATP and 
SNCP—which hindered development of cooperative mechanisms (Larroque et al, 2002). Yet 
the region absorbed unanimous blame for increased congestion, the low quality of transport 
outside Paris, and the outer city urban crisis.26 As transport became the symbol of governance 
failure in the capital-city region, the Socialist, Communist and Green Parties each picked up 
the issue to strengthen their respective positions. Outside Paris, the parties drew on support 
from working and lower middle class residents, who disproportionately absorbed the burdens 
of the ageing and insufficient transport network, to denounce growing inequalities within the 
wider region and cast blame on the State and the Conservative Party.  
 
Nonetheless, such political contention and dissonance accelerated the maturation of the Ile-
de-france Regional Council, helped articulate suburban municipal interests, and facilitated 
policy experimentation and innovation. For instance, in the Seine-Saint-Denis Département, 
strong Communist mayors in Saint-Denis, Bobigny, and La Courneuve successfully 
developed their own urban tramway systems during the 1990s (prior to Paris). In particular, 
the December 1995 General Strike catalyzed a paradigm shift away from the automobile-
centered policy in the capital-city region. As the public transport network was completely 
paralyzed for three long weeks, users spontaneously turned to cycling, car sharing, and other 
alternative transport solutions en masse. In so doing, the strike unexpectedly demonstrated to 
policymakers across levels of government that various transport alternatives existed and 
                                                
24 Each company developed its own technical solution for new rapid-transit capacity: SNCF championed a rail-
based solution—Eole—while the RATP favored an automated metro line—Meteor. In the end, both projects 
were eventually adopted, with the construction of the RER E line by SNCF, and the metro line 14 by the RATP.  
25 Additional projects included the extension of the RER D line, some renovation of the RER network and the 
slow extension of some metro lines in communes next to Paris. 
26 Users groups mobilized against the bad quality of suburban train services in the working class district of 
Mantes La Jolie and in the outer suburbs of Seine et Marne. 
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should be encouraged beyond Paris. The regional council put out a specific grant for 
financing additional public transport investments during the 1994-2000 funding period. 
Following the January 1996 release of the Tiberi Administration’ cycle plan for Paris,27 it 
further made efforts to encourage cycling at the regional level as part of the Regional Plan for 
Soft Mobility (May 1996).28 Where such measures largely existed at the margins in the 
capital-city region, the election of a Socialist-Green majority at both the regional level (1998) 
and in Paris (2001) would emerge as strong policy alternatives to the dominant approach to 
transport. 
 	  
 
 
The Making of a New Mode of Urban Regional 
Governance Under the Left-Green Alliance (1997-
2015): Innovation, New Policies, and Political 
Conflict 
	  
Following, the election of a Socialist-Green majority in the city of Paris, the new Socialist 
Mayor, Bertrand Delanoé, assumed leadership over a ruling majority including various 
parties of the left but most importantly the Greens. The Parisian Greens had singled out 
transport and mobility as their key policy issue since their time of opposition to the right 
wing mayors, Chirac and Tiberi. Drawing their strength from a strong base of social 
movements and neighborhood-based organizations as well as impressive electoral results, 
they highlighted transport and mobility as priority areas for municipal policy intervention in 
negotiating the coalition agreement with the Socialist Party. As the interests of the two parties 
aligned on this issue as well as urban planning and environmental protection, transport and 
mobility gained a large share of the municipal budget, while Green Party members were 
appointed as deputy mayors (Pichon 2012).  	  
PARIS TAKES THE LEAD: THE SOCIALIST-GREEN COALITION AND 
THE INVENTION OF SUSTAINABLE URBAN MOBILITY  
The Socialist-Green Agenda for Transport 
As Delanoé’s Deputy Mayor for Transport (2001-2008), the prominent Green Party 
representative Denis Baupin promoted a radical transformation of transport and mobility in 
Paris, investing massive political resources despite strong resistance from pro-car interests, 
                                                
27 In Paris, the Tiberi administration elaborated and presented a cycle plan in January 1996 that included the 
development of two major cycling axes in Paris (A 6 km north-south axis and a 7 km long east-west axes) as 
well as the right for cyclists to use bus lanes (effectively implemented in 1999). Bus lanes were subsequently 
enlarged and physically separated from car traffic. 
28 This laid the groundwork for a cycling policy in the Ile-de-France region, which would come to fruition afer 
1998 upon election of the Socialist-Green majority. 
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RATP and SNCF, and state administration.29 For the first time, the City of Paris developed an 
integrated approach to transport and mobility, first focusing on the reduction of car use by 
enhancing public transport before including sustainable transport modes such as cycling and 
walking. Widely considered a major political success contributing the reelection of the left in 
Paris in 2008 and 2014, the programme became a source for inspiration to other cities 
worldwide. That the left coalition—including the Socialists, Greens, and Communists—won 
three consecutive elections and has governed Paris for 14 years has enabled the systematic 
development of transport innovations over time.30 
 
Mayor Delanoé additionally used transport as a cornerstone for transforming central-local 
power relations. Previous debates over the development of a circular urban tram network 
alongside the city’s outer borders had demonstrated for the Socialist Party the necessity of 
Green Party support in exceeding the city’s traditional areas of intervention and competences 
in transport—road traffic and parking (Zittoun 2008). Aside from forming a majority within 
the city, they also needed to successfully mobilize at regional and state levels and against 
transport operators to promote an urban approach to transport and mobility issues. Green 
Party representatives helped develop joint actions across levels of government and in various 
legislative assemblies, exerting strong and continued pressure for sustainable urban transport, 
in part by mobilizing constituent social and economic groups.  
 
Yet the role of the socialist-green coalition as well as its collaborative dynamics should not 
be overstated. Some of the proposed transport measures were inherited from the Tiberi 
administration or inspired from experiences of other French or European cities, such as the 
Velib bike-sharing system (first experimented in Vienna, La Rochelle and Lyon) (Huré, 
2012). Most decisions on transport entailed lengthy negotiations within the ruling coalition 
on a case-by-case basis and according to budgetary and political constraints. During 
Delanoé’s first mayoral term, significant portions of the municipal budget were allocated to 
transport issues, but subsequent competition with other policy issues such as housing reduced 
budget allocations in the second term (Foing 2012) 31 . The table below provides an 
assessment of proposed policy measures and the extent to which they were implemented.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Socialist-Green coalition in action 
 
Policy measures  Formal adoption  Effective implementation  
Urban tramway network alongside 
the Boulevard des Maréchaux  
2000 (Tiberi 
administration) and 2003 
public enquiry  
2006 – 1st extension between 2009 and 2012; 
2nd extension underway  
Urban tramway network within the 
inner-city  
Failed     
                                                
29 He developed his agenda in favor of car reduction in a book published in 2007, « Tout voiture, no future ».  
30 Delanoé was elected twice (2001-2014) and his deputy Anne Hidalgo was elected Mayor in 2014. 
31 Baupin and the Greens obtained poor results during the 2008 electoral campaign; he remained deputy mayor 
for environment, whereas transport and mobility issues were allocated to Annick Lepetit (socialist party).  
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Transform several areas of Paris into 
“green areas”.   
  Mostly in left-wing Arrondissements  
Develop a local mobility plan for 
Paris (in complement to the Ile-de-
France Region urban mobility plan)  
Failed    
Creation of a green network  2006  Very limited  
Dismantling of urban expressways 
and development of right-of-way 
bus lanes  
2001-2007 and 2008-
2014  
Progressive but systematic (Boulevard 
Magenta, Jean Jaurès, etc.)  
Access to the Seine River  2008-2014  Southern way closed in 2013 and northern side 
to be transformed.   
Development of a cycling network - 
Vélib  
2007   2007 through a public-private partnership with 
JC Decaux (as opposed to free access) – 
Extended to adjacent municipalities after 2009  
 
The Invention of a Parisian Model of Urban Sustainable Transport 
The Parisian approach to sustainable transport relies on the transformation of urban public 
space as a way to reduce road space available for automobile traffic (Deroubaix and Leheis, 
2011).32 The approach grew out of the Tiberi-era controversy over the Parisian urban 
tramway, more specifically the second proposal developed by the city administration, which 
failed to gain political consensus and policy traction but nevertheless carried important 
consequences. Thereupon, the Socialist-Green coalition prioritized transport and mobility 
issues as part of their respective programs and accumulated knowledge and other resources to 
develop alliances and partnerships across levels of government as well as inside and outside 
the city administration with urban planners and local communities. Following the election of 
Mayor Delanoé, the administration formally chose the second proposal for implementation 
against strong opposition from local shop-owners, the right-wing party (Rally for the 
Republic/Union for a Popular Movement), and adjacent municipalities.  	  
Strategically tapping into public concerns about noise (going back to the Chirac era), the city 
introduced a series of measures to reduce car use throughout Mayor Delanoé’s first term 
(2001-2008). While emphasizing a low profile issue—noise—instead of the highly 
contentious issue of car use, the Deputy Mayor of Environmental Affairs, Yves Contassot 
(Green Party), leveraged national funds made available by new national legislation 
encouraging introduction of traffic calming measures and development of pedestrian zones as 
part of urban regeneration programs. Drawing on the noise measurement and location tools 
previously developed under the Tiberi administration, the city further developed tools for 
monitoring and raising public awareness (e.g., noise maps, noise measuring stations and an 
anti-noise observatory). As an alternative to the Préfecture’s existing approach (Zittoun 
2007), it promoted a comprehensive strategy against noise that combined urban and street 
design, reduction of road space available to cars, and construction of right-of-way bus and 
cycle lanes.33 The city transformed various squares to reduce parking and road space and 
promote alternative uses of public spaces, including walking, cycling and leisure activities. 
                                                
32 This stands in contrast with congestion pricing and other economic tools favored in places like London. 
33 The latter would not only entail taking away parking spaces on roads, which dated back to the Chirac and 
Tiberi administrations, but further lead to taking cars off the roads altogether. 
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Such efforts proceeded with greater intensity following the 2008 national decree in favor of 
pedestrian priority zones.34  
 
In combination with such low profile, incremental policies, the Delanoé administration 
launched flagship initiatives such as reclaiming public access to the Seine River. Again, the 
city did not frame it as a transport initiative but as part of the Delanoé administration’s efforts 
to “give Paris back to its inhabitants.” It began with small-scale, interim programs such as 
Paris Plage (2002), which temporarily closed off large urban motorways on the banks of the 
Seine to create artificial beaches. This seasonal event built on ongoing practice since the 
1990s of closing the highway on Sundays for pedestrians and cyclists and expanded the time 
to several weeks during the summer. Combined with seasonal leisure activities and mixed 
uses, Paris Plage attracted a growing number of users every summer and contributed to the 
city’s worldwide self-positioning as a liveable city and hotspot of experimentation in 
transport and mobility services (in competition with London and other world cities)35. 
Beyond active urban marketing, access to the river bank signified a major step towards 
regaining space from the private car and was later included in Mayor Delanoé’s transport 
strategy. Following, in 2012, the City of Paris decided to pedestrianize a section of the urban 
highway flanking the left bank of the Seine. In 2013, the southern route (Rive Gauche) was 
closed in 2013 and the proposed conversion of the northern route (Rive Droite)—the George-
Pompidou urban motorway—into an urban boulevard became a hotly debated topic during 
the 2014 municipal election campaign.  
 
This decade-long planning process carried long-term consequences for urban transport and 
mobility agenda setting in Paris. First, it contributed to the development of a uniquely 
Parisian approach to sustainable urban mobility. It relied upon the city’s extensive capacity 
for developing autonomous policy alternatives without necessarily receiving support from 
transport authorities and operators (RATP, SNCF, Ministry of transport). It also highlighted 
the instrumental role of transport for developing large-scale urban renewal programs in areas 
located at the margins of the capital-city. It further targeted the automobile as a source of 
nuisance and actively sought to reduce car use by developing alternative transportation and 
reclaiming available road space for other uses. Second, by highlighting the urban dimension 
of transport and mobility, this strategy contributed to further differentiating the Socialist-
Green policy offer from that of the Conservative Party, but also, from those of the Socialist 
and Green Parties at the regional and national level.  	  
RESOURCE ACCUMULATION AND RENEGOTIATING POWER 
RELATIONS IN TRANSPORT  
 
An innovative dimension of Mayor Delanoé’s strategy for increasing the autonomy of the 
City of Paris relied upon systematic resource accumulation in terms of funding and expertise. 
A pivotal measure was the reorganization of tendering procedures throughout the city 
administration and Delanoé’s successive terms as a way to break with Chirac and Tiberi era 
clientelistic arrangements by encouraging competition. In the case of transport and mobility, 
the resource accumulation strategy entailed considerable administrative changes—reshuffling 
                                                
34 These initiatives drew on a new generation of policy principles such as the protection of vulnerable users, 
which were made operational through changes in the Highway Code, including 30km/h zones. 
35 Interviews with Mobility Agency, May 2015 and City of Paris, Department for Transport, February 2016.  
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funding priorities in favor of transport and urban renewal, reorganizing administrative 
resources under the supervision of the Traffic Department, and creating the Mobility Agency 
(2011) with a concentration on research and innovations activities. The Delanoé 
administration further pursued funding outside of the transport sector (e.g. urban 
regeneration, environmental protection, EU) while negotiating new power relations with 
RATP and creating innovative forms of public-private partnerships. 
 
In developing the first Parisian tramway line, the city reframed the transport project as part of 
a larger urban renewal programme, effectively enlarging the scope of stakeholders and 
drawing on policy resources and tools from the urban planning sector, including the powerful 
urban development agency (APUR). Meanwhile, RATP underwent organizational 
restructuring in response to decentralization reforms and the growing role of local 
municipalities in the funding and organization of transport. In 2001, it opened a local agency 
in Paris, which was largely autonomous in overseeing the daily management of the bus 
network and leadership over project development, such as the opening of new bus and urban 
tramway lines. The local agency primarily attracted engineers sympathetic to the Socialist-
Green sustainable urban mobility plan,36 as well as members of the Communist majority 
union in RATP with previous experience in the development of urban tramways in the Seine 
Saint Denis Département. As a result, this agency played a critical role in advising the first 
Delanoé administration (2001-2008) to develop some of its flagship projects in the field of 
transport—Urban Tramway Lines 1 and 2, Rapid Transit Bus Line 91, and the City of Paris 
Mobility and Transport Plans.37 Over time—paralleling trends in the city administration—
new generations of highly skilled engineers sought to join this project development team in 
contrast to their predecessors who had preferred SNCF (e.g., high-speed, Transilien, Eole) 
and RATP (meteor) flagship projects. Throughout France, continued decentralization reforms 
and massive investments in urban mobility across large metropolitan areas elevated urban 
mobility and transportation from marginal status among transport engineers and state elites to 
a prominent issue and a highly sought after experience.38 
 
The City of Paris further used its strengthened knowledge in the area of urban transport to 
explore alternative funding solutions and transportation services as in the case of the Paris 
Velib bicycle sharing system. As argued by Huré (2012), the system itself is less considered a 
major innovation in transport than the underlying economic model (see also Boullier, 2014). 
While the Greens envisioned a publicly-funded cycling network for Paris, Mayor Delanoé 
and the Socialist Party drew inspiration from the work achieved in Lyon by another Socialist-
Green coalition—a bicycle sharing system operated through a concession by JC Decaux, a 
family-owned and French-based advertising company company. 39   The Parisian Velib 
                                                
36 In some cases, these pioneers were members of the Green Party themselves and had served as technical 
advisers to Dominique Voynet (green Environmental Minister between 1997 and 2001) (Interviews with RATP 
representatives, May and June 2015).  
37 This was despite little initial interest by RATP management in the development of urban tramways. 
38 This process culminated after 2010 with SNCF creating its own subsidiary Keolis and proclaiming itself an 
urban mobility service provider. A similar process takes place in the transport industry.   
39 JC Decaux specializes in street furniture and holds 80% of the French market. Its economic model is simple: 
the installation and maintaining of a large range of street furniture is financed through a monopoly on 
advertising revenues. As the company wished to increase its long-standing partnership with the city of Lyon 
against its main competitor, the American based company Clear Channel, it proposed the development of a 
metropolitan bicycle sharing system in exchange for renewing its contract for the next 13 years. The Velov 
system was introduced in Lyon in 2004 and marketed worldwide by both JC Decaux and the Grand Lyon as a 
major innovation in the field of urban mobility. 
  
The Case of Paris and the Ile-de-France Region   17 
TUT-POL Draft: May 2016; Do Not Quote, Cite or Distribute Without Permission. 
 
system, introduced in 2007, was developed on a similar basis but on a much larger scale in 
terms of the number of bicycles per inhabitants and geographical coverage. Also, 
incorporating the Visa credit card system, Paris enhanced access to include non-residents 
(Boullier 2014).40 With the Velib system constituting the most visible component, the urban 
cycling network has vastly expanded, with some 700-km of cycling lanes planned since 2001, 
of which 65% was effectively built by 2014. In 2013, introduction of the Autolib’, an electric 
car sharing system, incorporated a similar public-private partnership with the Bolloré 
Group,41 which then used Autolib’ as an opportunity to promote its electric car system, Blue 
Car, at the international level.  
 
Finally, internationalization triggered small-scale experimentation in transport and mobility 
through the use of benchmarks, bids for European funding and active participation in 
European and International networks of cities. The search for alternative funding sources also 
facilitated research and development activities, sometimes in partnership with universities, 
state-owned enterprises (RATP, EDF) but rarely with the Region and the State. Such 
experimentation offered a unique opportunity to explore new dimensions of urban transport 
on a short-term basis and at lower cost, while at the same time, drawing on findings and 
results to develop coherent citywide policies and programs.42  
 
 
 
 
The End of Unilateralism? Competition for 
Leadership Over Transport in the Ile-de-France 
Region 
 
As the City of Paris gained considerable financial and political autonomy and developed an 
approach to sustainable urban transport that prioritized policy demands and priorities catering 
to its own residents rather than the State, it faced strong criticism from suburban 
municipalities within the Ile-de-France region, which problematized the profound inequalities 
between Paris and the inner suburbs. At the same time, major transformations were also 
taking place at the regional level. Following the election of a Socialist-Green- Communist 
majority in 1998 with Jean-Paul Huchon (Socialist Party) at its head, the Ile-de-France 
Regional Council gained new policy resources in the field of transport, including support 
from suburban municipalities. The budget and autonomy of the regional council were far 
below that of Paris City Council, even as staff and budget size as well as the level of 
expertise rise rapidy under Huchon (1998-2015). Yet the regional level became increasingly 
important, as successive decentralization reforms transferred authority over regional spatial 
planning and mobility and transport planning from the State to the region. Besides having its 
own Planning and Development Agency (Institut d’Aménagement et d’urbanisme—IAU), 
                                                
40 This is a major difference with the choice made in other large metropolitan cities worldwide, in which the 
bicycle sharing system is limited to city residents or to public transport users. 
41 The Bolloré Group is a large French-based company specializing in transport, logistics and advertising among 
others. 
42 Current efforts now lie with urban logistics, electromobility, and the management of big data. 
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the regional council took over the Regional Transport Authority—Parisian Transport 
Syndicat (STP), renamed Syndicat des Transports d’Ile-de-France (STIF) in 2004.  	  
The STIF facilitates inter-municipal negotiation and new forms of 
cooperation 
Despite competition in the field of planning, mainly due to the historic rivalry between the 
regional and Parisian development agencies (IAU versus APUR), the STIF emerged as a 
preferred arena for inter-municipal negotiation and new forms of cooperation. Besides 
providing a venue for political and technical discussions about operationalizing transport 
policy goals in the capital-city region, including the City of Paris,43 STIF gained additional 
capacity to effectively negotiate new policy goals with transport operators and local 
authorities while streamlining policy offers across the region. From 2000 onwards, it 
introduced bilateral short-term contracts between the two main transport operators (RATP 
and SNCF) to enhace the quality of transport service delivery and internal management.44 
STIF further oversaw negotiations on spending allocations of versement transport revenues 
and defined the tax rate for versement transport across the region—the STIF’s largest source 
of income (39.1% of total operating revenue in 2014)45, together with fare revenues 
(29.7%)46 and local, regional and state subsidies (19.2%)47.  
 
In Paris, Denis Baupin, Deputy Mayor for Transport, and the Greens clearly led the urban 
sustainability mobility agenda, while at the regional level, Mayor Delanoé and Pierre Mansat, 
Deputy Mayor for Territorial Cooperation and Community Party member, initiated informal 
cooperation between the City of Paris and suburban municipalities as part of the “Paris 
Métropole Initiative.”48 Drawing on Mansat’s political network within the “red suburbs” of 
Paris, they forged new scopes for cooperation in the field of transport, energy, and housing 
and to enhance urban services in the inner suburbs. Moreover, in the area of transport, 
Mansat successfully negotiated the support of suburban municipalities for expanding existing 
transport systems beyond the City of Paris, offering in turn the city’s support during funding 
negotiations with the Region, the STIF, and the State.  In revising—and subsequently 
raising—the versement transport rate and facilitating agreement on differentiated rates 
between the City of Paris and the inner and outer suburbs, STIF became the effective setting 
for negotiating transport planning and implementation in the capital-city region. In exchange 
for more autonomy, the City of Paris agreed to develop new mobility services at its own cost. 
This occurred partly at the expenses of outer suburbs, where the quality and density of 
                                                
43 As the regional public transport authority regional planning and funding in the field of public transport, it 
brings together the Region, 8 Conseils Généraux (Départements) and the City of Paris, it oversees. 
44 The current programming period runs between 2012 and 2015.  
45 It is defined by the STIF as a percentage of companies’ payroll and within a ceiling that is fixed by the 
government. Currently, the rate applied is 2.6% for companies located in Paris and the Hauts-de-Seine County; 
1.7% for those in Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne Counties; and 1.4% in the outer ring of the region.  
46 Since 1982, public and private employers in the region must reimburse 50% of their employees’ season fares. 
In 2014, their contribution represented 9.3% of all operation expenses. 
47 Since 2004, the State has stopped subsidizing operating costs, apart from school transport, and State funds are 
available mainly for capital investment. The regional council and counties provide funding that cover for the 
costs of discounted fares, and local governments also directly fund public transport subsidies. Other income 
sources include advertising and proceeds from traffic fines collected at the regional level (2.7% of STIF’s 
budget).  
48 The City of Paris much depended on the support of suburban municipalities in dismantling urban motorways 
in the city center and reducing road space available for cars. 
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transport services are lower, and later justified the introduction of a single, region-wide tariff 
zone in 2015.  
 
 	  
Towards the Liveable Region? The Upscaling of 
the Sustainable Mobility Agenda 	  
Reversing the historic trend whereby the regional/national motorway network expanded into 
the City of Paris, discussions at the regional level around the 2007 Regional Spatial Planning 
Document (SDRIF) and the 2008 Regional Mobility Plan considered expanding the Parisian 
sustainable transport model towards the inner suburbs. Both documents advocated an 
approach to spatial planning and transport that sought to “give the region back to its 
inhabitants” and increase liveability and quality of life. For the first time, the regional council 
led the planning process with the support of IAU, the Planning and Development Agency,49 
concertedly promoting a more collaborative approach to policy design and planning, partly as 
a way to limit urban sprawl in the region and re-urbanize existing urban centers. Within 
STIF, a capacity-oriented and infrastructure-led approach to transport gave way to a focus on 
improving public transport service quality. STIF signed performance-based operation 
agreements with the region’s main transport operators—RATP and SNCF—to expand the 
metro, develop the urban tramway, and extend right-of-way bus lanes beyond the Boulevard 
Périphérique. In 2001, it introduced Mobilien, high service bus routes operating at the 
regional level, and made significant efforts to provide region-wide travel information, change 
the tariff policy, and install new ticketing systems (e.g., Imagine R card for students, creation 
of the Ticket t50).  
 
Suburban municipalities additionally relied on alternative resources to accelerate the 
diffusion of sustainable mobility. A new piece of national environmental legislation formally 
opened the scope for experimentation in the urban mobility area. After 2008, funding support 
became available for development of alternative transportation systems, car and bike renting 
systems, congestion charges, and electric cars. The State strictly monitored its 
implementation through successive competitive calls for projects (respectively in 2008 and 
2011) to which both the industry and specific types of municipalities (i.e. medium-sized 
cities, deprived neighborhoods, and interurban mobility) could apply. Extended beyond Paris 
city borders, the Vélib’ system now accounts for a total of 23,000 bikes (or 1 for 97 in 2014) 
and 1,800 stations in Paris and 30 adjacent municipalities. In constituting the most visible 
part of the burgeoned a cycling network throughout the region, the Velib system also 
provoked a shift away from an auto-centric approach in the inner suburbs in favor of 
alternative transportation beyond public transport. Municipalities and départements 
negotiated cycling infrastructure investments as part of successive Regional Mobility Plans 
(see also table below), in part, spurring development of “cycling gateways” connecting 
                                                
49 Among the ranks of the Ile-de-France Regional Council, the new Vice President of Transport, Pierre Serne, 
was a former advisor to Baupin in the City of Paris Baupin himself was elected as an MP in 2012, and paid less 
attention altogether to transport and mobility issues as he became vice president of the French Parliament.   
50 The ticket t is a single trip ticket common to all transport companies 
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various cycling networks. As with the Velib system, the Autolib’ system was developed 
across 64 municipalities. 
 
 
Figure 6. Cycling networks in the Ile-de-France Region— 
 Planned vs. achieved between 2000 and 2012 
 
 Planned (in km) Existing  Level of achievement (%) 
Paris (75) 700 400 63 
Val-de-Marne (94) 480 200 41 
Yvelines (78) 500 278 56 
Essone (91) 427 71,5  17 
Val d’Oise (95) 500 100 20 
Seine-et-Marne 
(77) 
1300 541 42 
Total 4172 2522 60 	  	  
Together, these municipal initiatives fostered a major shift in regional transport policy goal 
setting. Drawing on the preparatory work done by the STIF as part of the Regional Mobility 
Plan (PDUIF), the Socialist-Green majority sought to develop its own sustainable transport 
plan and to further differentiate itself from both the State and the municipalities. In contrast 
to the 1994 version, the 2007 SDRIF was defined by smaller scale and more incremental 
investments along with a more autonomous vision of the capital region’s future development 
that prioritized policy objectives serving the region’s residents rather than the State. In 
contrast to the 1994 SDRIF, public transport and the development of sustainable 
transportation received much attention.51 In place of a radial network towards the City of 
Paris, it aimed, on the one hand, to develop direct and rapid connections between large urban 
and economic centers in the periphery, and on the other hand, to forge new interconnections 
between existing networks and the new circular axes. To fund the plan, the region suggested 
a 10-year investment programme co-funded by the region, the State, the Départments and the 
municipalities for a total amount of €19 billion. Political debates on the new transport plan 
became exceptionally heated, both within the regional council and among the region, the 
State, and local authorities. Besides accusations that the plan was overly driven by party 
politics and the Socialist-Green coalition, the region received blame for the purported 
absence of a “grand vision”, lack of political ambition, and incapacity to foster agreement 
about the economic future of the Paris-Ile-de-France region. With strong levels of distrust 
and conflicts also characterizing State-region administrative relations, state representatives in 
the region repeatedly challenged their regional counterparts.  
 
The State’s reaction to the 2007 SDRIF came as a great surprise when the newly elected 
president Sarkozy’s 2007 instead presented the Grand Paris Strategy,52 widely understood as 
                                                
51 It also puts less emphasis on roads and more so on regional trains and maintenance. It should be noted that 
road competencies also evolved following the 2004 decentralization reform. All national roads that are not part 
of the national motorway network were transferred to the départements. 
52 It was held on the occasion of the opening of a new satellite at Charles de Gaulle airport on June 26, 2007: 
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/077002121.html   
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a war declaration against the region and, more generally, a clear denial of local autonomy. 
Making clear references to the pre-1975 period and the “Golden Age” of regional planning 
under state leadership, Sarkozy’s strategic plan for the capital region by 2030 publicly 
challenged the regional government’s legitimacy and blamed local authorities for their 
supposed inability to foster cooperative dynamics in the Ile-de-France region. As a former 
local elected representative of the affluent western suburb of Paris,53 he was particularly 
critical of the notion that regional strategic planning might prioritize the demands and 
interests of residents than promoting the role and function of Ile-de-france as the capital city-
region. Blocking the formal adoption of the 2007 SDRIF, Sarkozy commenced the “battle 
over the Grand Paris project,” which would last until 2013 and reach far beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Yet this debate also confirmed the strength and salience of the sustainable urban 
transport approach that developed in Paris and diffused towards the inner suburbs, while at 
the same time, accelerating the emergence of a regional transport model as a reaction to state 
interventionism. With support from Ile-de-France region MPs and across political parties, 
Parliament developed a strong alternative to the Sarkozy Grand Paris strategy, and in turn, 
local elected representatives bypassed party politics and territorial competition to achieve 
political consensus on the vision for regional transport and formalize it as the 2010 Grand 
Paris Law. The conflict further revealed continued mistrust on the part of state elites against 
regional organization and local autonomy in transport and spatial planning, as indicated by 
the creation of the new state-owned organization, Société du Grand Paris, for the purpose of 
planning and developing new infrastructures (e.g., orbital railway, several metro lines) and 
raising capital investments. Finally, the State continued its “divide and rule” strategy—
cognizant of the enduring conflicts among RATP and SNCF over the larger transport system 
and their detrimental consequences, it willfully neglected to impose major changes to 
disentangle their respective networks (Carrez, 2010; Goldberg, 2012). 	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 	  
In sum, transport developments in Paris and the Ile-de-france region over the past four 
decades reveal dialectics between multiple initiatives and conflicting political leadership on 
the one hand, and the incremental making of a mode of governance, with massive and 
transformative outcomes on the other. Beyond political leadership, negotiation and reaction 
                                                
53 N. Sarkozy built his entire political career at the local level, in the municipality of Neuilly-sur-Seine, the 
wealthiest municipality of the Ile-de-France Region.	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played critical roles, as key mechanisms leading to gradual adjustments and impressive 
results in urban transport. Competition between different levels of government—and 
especially, strong reactions by local authorities against state interventionism—spurred 
respective mobilizations of resources and helped bring about policy innovation and change in 
transport. In turn, transport played a role in shaping a new mode of urban regional 
governance in the French capital-city region. In a context of continued territorial reforms and 
increased competition between the French capital-city and other large metropolises 
worldwide, transport emerged as a critical issue and instrumental mechanism for asserting 
political and institutional leadership, developing new alliances, and gaining visibility at 
various levels and scales. The resulting systematic accumulation of policy resources and 
introduction of highly visible initiatives helped strengthen the territorial dimension of 
transport policies in the capital region and accelerated a shift in mobility behavior.  
 
In terms of key actors, the Paris case featured an interesting mix between key individuals and 
innovative forms of collective action among political parties and municipalities as well as 
across levels of government and the public and private sector. Leadership was decidedly 
collective, drawing upon strong mechanisms of cooperation between levels of government, 
robust political coalitions and alliances (i.e. the Gaullist-Communist agreement in the 1960s, 
the Socialist-Green agreement in the 2000s, and recently, the cross-party coalition against 
Sarkozy), and negotiation in a multi-level governance system. At the same time, the City of 
Paris distinguished itself as a leading transport policy entrepreneur and innovator and 
successfully enrolled other municipalities in the inner suburbs area. Despite reactions from 
the State and the Region, Paris dominated agenda-setting dynamics through its ability to 
mobilize political and knowledge resources, achieve impressive results around sustainable 
mobility from a series of both small-scale and highly visible policy experiments. Yet its 
success resulted from the combination of unilateralist decisions and new forms of 
cooperation with suburban municipalities. At the regional level, institutional rescaling and the 
selection of STIF as a preferred venue helped render the region as a key player in transport 
planning and facilitate the adoption of an integrated sustainable transport agenda for the 
capital region. 
 
The battle over the Grand Paris Express not only reveals the robustness of the new regional 
mode of governance in transport but also regional authorities’ relative weakness in 
negotiations with the State and the City of Paris. Today, local authorities (municipalities and 
départements) prefer to negotiate political and technical agreements between about transport 
planning and implementation in the capital region at the regional scale. Yet recent attempts to 
expand the leadership of regional transport authorities—including STIF—as part of a new 
wave of decentralization reform elicited strong opposition from local authorities, including 
the City of Paris, on the basis of protecting local autonomy. Also, the new regional mode of 
governance only applies to transport planning and implementation; in most other policy 
areas, competition among the three levels of government continues to overrule as recently 
demonstrated by the controversies over air pollution peaks, the question of whether or not the 
newly created metropolitan government should any competences in transport, and leadership 
over the application to host Olympic games.  
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Appendix 1. List of Interviewees, Paris Ile-de-
France case 
 
NB: This list of interviewees has been anonymized according to the wishes of several 
interviewees. 
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1. DR, Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la région Ile-de-France, Engineer, 
transport and mobility department, 13/04/20115 
2. FP, Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la région Ile-de-France, transport 
economist, project manager, 13/04/20115 
3. JPO, engineer, Leading transport expert, 16/04/2015 
4. SB, Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la région Ile-de-France, law and 
urban planning, 28/04/15 
5. PS, Conseil general du Val d’Oise, Transport Department, 06/05/15.  
6. JCB, RATP, 20/05/15 
7. DG, Member of Parliament, Socialist Party, 27/05/15 
8. GC, Member of Parliament, Les Républicains. 21/05/15 
9. IF, Ile-de-France region, Department of planning, regional planning and 
metropolitan strategies, 12/05/15 
10. AF, City of Paris, Mobility Agency, 12/05/2015 & 30/06/2015 
11. CA, Ile-de-France region, Department of Transport, 03/06/2015 
12. MC, Conseil general des Hauts de Seine (92), Transport infrastructures, 
19/05/2015 
13. FH, Ile-de-France Regional and Interdepartmental State Administration for 
infrastructure and planning (DRIEA), Department planning, 20/05/2015 
14. JCM, STIF, Relations with users, 02/06/15  
15. KM, STIF, Project manager, Department for economic affairs and tariff 
development, 28/05/15 
16. FD, SYSTRA, urban unit in the Ile-de-France region, 18/06/2015 
17. EG, Ile-de-France Regional and Interdepartmental State Administration for 
infrastructure and planning (DRIEA), Grand Paris Unit, 16/06/2015 
18. MF, elected representative Regional council, EELV party, June 2015 
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